This paper closely studies the historical experiences of computer users faced with incompatibility problems. One key point throughout the discussion is that operating system compatibilities and application software were the principal source of switching costs. The larger point here is that vendor specificity is partially a choice-variable for the buyer. It influences many facets of an organization, as well as management and employee behavior. Foresighted users anticipate that daily decisions regarding programming practices and equipment maintenance influence the costs of switching during a later vendor decision. Buyers take a wide variety of actions, both simple and complex. Most of the paper is concerned with documenting and analyzing how buyers change investments, collect information, manipulate bidding procedures and change managements practices-either in anticipation of, or in response to, incompatibility problems.
§ 1. Introduction jj It is a minor economic truism that today's information infrastructure 1 encompasses a broad spectrum of technically complementary equipment and support activities, involving a multiplicity of technical generations of | equipment from a wide variety of suppliers. Large corporate information I systems, wireless communication devices, large customized software applica-& tions, local area networks, and millions of miles of copper and fiber cables 0 comprise this network. Effective use of this equipment involves countless 1 hours of training, learning and sometimes delicate structuring of economic organizations. 3
It is closer to a major economic truism that many related historical and economic factors shape the evolution and diffusion of information equipment that embodies new technology. First, users are reluctant to retire capital that continues to offer a flow of useful services, even if technical change apparently depreciates the market value of those services. Second, vendors continue to sell old technology, develop it and improve it-enabling old technology to viably compete long after the introduction of the new (Rosenberg, 1977) . Third, buyers often delay purchases until anticipated price/performance improvements appear in new, still-developing technologies (Rosenberg, 1982) . Fourth, in markets where buyers employ systems of technically interrelated components, it is often the case that switching to new technologies may involve many technically difficult steps. Buyers may need to become informed about all these aspects or need to make other investments to take advantage of 'enabling' technologies (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1992) .
In light of the complexity of the economic situation, it is disappointing that most recent theoretical analysis of markets for compatible components treats a buyer's decisions so simply, focusing almost exclusively on a buyer's vendor choice or implied technology choice (for a survey see e.g. Besen and Saloner, 1988; David and Greenstein, 1990) . This simple treatment is apt to cause misunderstanding of what buyers do after they have made at least some technology-specific or vendor-specific investments. Many complex, subtle and relatively low-profile actions shape a buyer's ability to alter the detrimental effects of lock-in. The accumulation of these actions should, in turn, shape the connections between a buyer's initial choice and subsequent choices.
This paper closely studies the historical experiences of computer users faced with incompatibility problems. Most of the paper is concerned with documenting and analyzing how a buyer changes investments, collects information, manipulates bidding procedures and changes managements practices-either in anticipation of or in response to incompatibility problems. The ultimate goal of the paper is to draw general lessons about the economic and technical factors that shape buyer actions before and after vendor and technology choices: What kind of actions are feasible and why? What historical circumstances limit or exacerbate incompatibility problems and why? Which circumstances likely persist today? The answers inform our understanding of the origins of 'switching costs,' the likelihood of their persistence and the likelihood of change in information technology markets where switching costs influence buyer/vendor transactions.
The market for mainframe computing systems in the 1970s is the case from which this study draws general lessons. It is ideal because it is a complex and important market and the literature on standardization presumes that hardware-software lock-in plays an important role in computer user decision 248 making. Moreover, several unique studies by federal agencies into the costs of switching mainframe computer vendors provide a wealth of public (and otherwise unavailable) information about buyer behavior and possible buyer action. To some extent it is also not ideal, because the studies were commissioned as a result of bad performance or problems within federal agencies. Typically, these stories highlight the actions of slow bureaucratic organizations, who are thought to be less innovative than their commercial counterparts. In sum, the cases motivate general lessons well, but these must be drawn with care. The discussion is roughly organized into three sections. The first section reviews the literature on switching costs and briefly notes that most previous analysis focuses on the decision to select an initial vendor when ex post switching costs are anticipated. The second part discusses evidence that lock-in and switching costs were important and growing problems for government purchasers of mainframe computers and, by extension, all buyers of similar systems during the seventies. The final part documents and analyzes the wide variety of ways the government attempted to lessen costs associated with lock-in.
An implication from this study's historical account is that buyers probably played an active, yet largely undocumented, role in bringing about lower switching costs in this industry. On a market-wide level, buyer actions pushed sponsors of incompatible proprietary systems into competing with compatible system components. However, these actions only tended to reduce, not elirjijnate, vendor lock-in and market tendencies for technological lock-in. A related implication is that some of the technical circumstances producing lock-in in the past still exist today. Hence, one should expea some lock-in and related buyer behavior to exist in mainframe markets and probably in related information technologies. These actions lend themselves to more complex theoretical modeling, some of which has been done elsewhere and will be mentioned below, and some of which remains unexplored. Finally, this essay enhances empirical and statistical analysis of the impact of switching costs on vendor choice (Greenstein, I993a,b; Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1994) and market competitiveness (Greenstein, 1995) . While previous studies measured the factors underlying the statistical heterogeneity in the behavior of different federal agencies, this paper renders these and other unmeasured factors much more concrete.
The Links between Vendor and Technological Lock-in
Switching costs are incurred as a consequence of a buyer switching between alternative suppliers of essentially the same product. Large switching costs can make buyers reluctant to switch suppliers. The discussion in this section briefly reviews the literature on switching costs. The main point is that most previous analysis focuses on supplier behavior and the buyer's decision to select an initial vendor when ex post switching costs are anticipated.
Much research focuses on seller behavior when buyers make commitment to a technology and its sponsor in the face of technical uncertainty. Klemperer's models (1987a,b) are excellent representatives of this type of analysis (for a general approach see Beggs and Klemperer, 1990; Klemperer, 1992) . The general thrust of these models is that later period lock-in induces fierce competition for initial buyer commitment, which may compete away some of the anticipated monopoly rents. However, not all rents will be competed away when technological uncertainty prevents buyers and sellers from forecasting which supplier will best suit a user's future needs. Moreover, the match between buyers and sellers may not be satisfactory as technical uncertainty is asymmetrically resolved among competing firms. Some vendors may not offer the same product as before, some will have innovated appropriately, others not at all. Some buyers will find that they are very satisfied with their earlier choices and will order again from them. Others may have vendors whom they would prefer to leave, but continue to use due to the costs of switching. Still others will be so dissatisfied that they incur the switching costs for another vendor better suited to their needs.
In a related vein, there is a general presumption that buyers prefer markets where firms provide compatible 'mix-and-match' components (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988) . The market for stereo equipment is a familiar example (Postrel, 1990) , and in recent times the market for IBM-compatible personal computers has come close to this ideal Robertson and Langlois, 1992) . Some theoretical counter-examples have been developed, but these hardly dent the presumption that mix-and-match markets are more competitive, more innovative and provide a wider set of choices for buyers (Greenstein, 1992) .
Finally, the literature generally presumes that the interests of proprietary vendors of technology are opposed to buyers (e.g. Bresnahan and Chopra, 1990) . While buyers almost always prefer that all components employ the same non-proprietary standard, vendors may or may not prefer such an outcome. In particular, it is commonly assumed that an incumbent with an established proprietary network will resist any movement toward a more competitive mix-and-match structure. Once buyers invest in their first systems, technology sponsors may have incentives to design incompatible systems if incompatibility raises user's switching costs (Katz and Shapiro, 250 1985) . Similarly, the literature often presumes that vendors may actively seek to prevent the entry of gateway technologies-i.e. bridges to make incompatible technologies compatible (Carlton and Klamer, 1983) . In most historical analyses, there is a tendency for one technology to dominate a market at any point in time, particularly in markets subject to positive network externalities.
1 Notable examples of technology lock-in come from nuclear power plant design (Cowan, 1988) , video cassette recorders (Cusumano et a/., 1991) , the typewriter keyboard (David, 1985) , DC motors (David and Bunn, 1988) , stereo systems (Postrel, 1990) , broadcasting (Besen and Johnson, 1986) and AM-FM radio (Besen, 1992) . Interesting exceptions to these generalities tend to occur at early stages in a product's development, before a dominant design has emerged (for many examples see Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) . More generally, lock-in occurs for many reasons, not just network exernalities. In most high-cost capital goods markets, where repeat ordering occurs, lock-in is common. This is often due to close user-producer relations and joint learning and innovation for product development (as well as customization). Most large-scale, high-cost, complex business-to-business capital equipment purchases (e.g. aircraft, military systems, manufacturing systems) share these features. Indeed, lock-in and standardization issues often lie at the heart of bargaining between large buyers and vendors (e.g. airlines and aircraft, DOD, telecommunications equipment for telephone exchanges).
The computer market is another example that is often cited. Because users of computer systems invest in systems of compatible components (i.e. hardware and software and training), it is widely presumed that computer users tend to 'lock-in' to their incumbent vendors. Yet, little careful study of the computer market confronts this belief with either empirical fact or skepticism.
2 Also troubling is the presumption that buyers have control only 1 A number of economUu have emphasized the importance of network externalities for technological lock-in. For example, Arthur (1989) propose! a model where technology use is subject to positive network externalities. The value to buyers and vendors from using a technology increases as the number of adopters of that technology increases. As a result, differences in user preferences for different technologies interact with the strong tendency for everyone to adopt the technology used by everyone else. Once one technology builds up a large installed base of users, all subsequent users will continue to use that technology and lock-out alternatives. A similar emphasis can be found in the theoretical work of Katz and Shapiro (198) ) and Farrell and Saloner (198) ). The description made in the text corresponds with a market subject to 'indirect' network externalities (David and Greenstein, 1990) . 1 The most skepticism ever thrown on this argument can be found in Fisher a tl. (1983a), who argued that software-hardware was not a 'barrier to entry', as contended by a government witness in the anti-trust trial. Other than that, the closest in spirit to this paper is Langlois and Robertson (1992) , which examines the role of open architecture in the development of the personal computer industry, and Bresnahan and Greenstein (1992) , which examines the effect of inter-platform competition on the evolution of the computing industry. See Greenstein (1993a) for some econometric evidence on 'lock-in' in mainframes in the federal government.
over their own vendor choices and nothing else. It is as if buyers seek no other means to resist vendor lock-in, even though it is to their advantage to do so under many circumstances. If buyers successfully reduce vendor lock-in, entry of new components suppliers is easier and competition between different system sponsors more intense. The overall effect may be to move a market away from a structure characterized by sponsored competition and towards a mix-and-match market structure, which is characterized by much less vendor lock-in.
The relevant observation for this paper is straightforward. The theoretical literature presumes that buyers are better off if they reduce lock-in to a vendor when lock-in produces monopoly rents. If lock-in influences buyer action, one should expect to find it influencing many facets of an organization, as well as management and employee behavior. The open issue concerns the feasibility and limits of such actions and the general impact on market evolution.
A Case Study: Lock-in and Computing in Federal Agencies
In the late 1970s, many federal agencies began to experience large expenses related to the conversion of their software from one mainframe architecture to another. These 'conversion costs', as many government reports labeled them, raised a number of unexpected problems when agencies ordered replacement acquisitions or new systems from incompatible vendors. Because of these problems, the topic of conversion was closely studied by several federal oversight agencies who employed specialists in the "computer field-i.e. the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) and the General Services Administration (GSA). Fourteen different studies, cited below, left a detailed and public record of the conditions surrounding more than a dozen actual system acquisitions and the solutions attempted to conversion problems. The analysis aims to synthesize the observations made in these studies.
The main danger in using these examples is that the experiences of federal agencies may be unrepresentative of other mainframe users in the country at this time. In the 1970s expenditure on computers by public and quasi-public organizations represents roughly a quarter of the US mainframe computer market. Federal agencies comprise roughly 5%. Hence, the discussion focuses on agency use of commercial general purpose computers, which resembles the majority of computer use in private business at that time (Gray, 1981) . This eliminates discussion of mainframe use for idiosyncratic defense or purely scientific purposes, and helps compare and contrast the federal procurement process with other mainframe users. In addition, the material pertains only to 252 the era prior to the revolutionary changes in computing management associated with micro-computers; this earlier era is much simpler to analyze because most computer management and investment decisions were centralized (Inmon, 1986) . The discussion in this section highlights three types of evidence. First, it highlights factors that contributed to single-supplier relationships. Second, the discussion cites evidence of the limited nature of cross-vendor compatibility. Third, it documents the experiences of several users with compatibility problems and their costs. The key point throughout the discussion is that operating system compatibilities and application software were the principal source of switching costs.
The Available Choices between Vendors and Technologies
In the 1970s, the mainframe market was characterized by system competition between several large computer manufacturers. The installed stock of commercial general purpose mainframes, as shown in Table 1 , shows that federal agencies used general purpose systems from all the major firms, with IBM having the largest market share. The total number of systems in use often exceeded 2000 systems in any year. Table 2 shows that the number of new acquisitions per year was also substantial. Government sales did not constitute a large fraction of IBM's total sales, but it did make up a substantial fraction of the sales of Burroughs, CDC, Honeywell and Sperry-Univac (see also Werling, 1983, appendix; IDC, various years) .
There tended to be a one-to-one association of suppliers with computer mainframe technical families in the 1970s. 3 The exceptions were important and notable. First, not all IBM systems use the same system software, though IBM did reduce those costs by providing translators and emulators. 4 There was a distinction between the operating systems on the IBM360/370 family of systems, which was the most popular IBM system in the 1970s, and all previous IBM systems (although the IBM360/20 was only partially compatible with the rest of the 360 line). In the mid-to late 1970s, IBM introduced several new operating systems and hardware families, including ' Industry records frequently refer to the incompatibilities of the architecture and tyitem software of the general purpose mainframes produced by IBM, Burroughs, Unrvac-Sperry, NCR, CDC, Honeywell, DEC and others (Auerbach Reports, EDP Industry reports).
4 GAO (1977b) notes that it was possible to fit the IBM360 with an emulator that permitted the tyitem 360 to use software written for the 1400 series machines. However, the GAO did not recommend this as a long-term solution because these emulators sacrificed too much system performance. Greenstein (1993a) shows that the upgrade between the IBM 1400 series and the IBM 360 played a role in determining buyer decisions to stay with IBM or use other vendors. the 4300 series (which is part of Tables 1 and 2), that were also only partially compatible with its system 360/370 or the 300x series (which arrived near the end of this period), though they had many similar features. IBM sponsored two different operating systems for its mainframes, VM and MVS, intending to train new users on VM and migrate experienced users to MVS on the larger systems (Inmon, 1986) . Other exceptions came in two forms. First, a limited amount of CPU compatibility across firms did exist. For example, the RCA 7000 series, IBM360/370 series, and the system from Amdahl and National Advanced Systems all fell into the same product family, more or less. However, Tables 1  and 2 show that the IBM clones constituted a very small fraction of total 254 federal sales through the early 1980s. For example, Amdahl had only a tiny number of sales by 1983, when the data generating Tables 1 and 2 stopped being collected. 5 (The same is true of the RCA systems, though these acquisitions are not shown.) The comparable paucity of switching to IBM-compatible CPUs suggests that switching to products made by compatible CPU firms may not have been easy or that the imitations were not a good as the genuine IBM article; for example, RCA's systems were initially plagued by reliability problems (Fisher tt a/., 1983a) , and the Amdahl and ' In addition, Honeywell made a system compatible with the 1400 series and marketed a translator between its systems and IBM's (Fisher a *!., 1983). It is not clear how widely this was used by government agencies.
NAS clone providers initially had incomplete product lines and limited service, appealing primarily to large multisite users.
Second, several manufacturers made plug-compatible IBM system 360/ 370 peripherals which permitted users to, in principle, 'mix-and-match' components in the 360/370 operating system from different manufacturers by the end of the 1970s. There was wide use of plug-compatible peripherals such as terminals, storage devices and input devices, though not of CPUs (for further details see Greenstein, 1989) . This evidence suggests that switching to products made by (non-IBM) compatible peripheral firms was feasible by the end of the decade. Note, however, little is known about the use of non-proprietary software, probably the most important component in a mix-and-match computer market.
The larger point is that switching costs generally arose due to changing from one incompatible operating system to another, not necessarily from moving between suppliers. By the early 1970s IBM and the BUNCH (Burroughs, Univac, NCR, CDC and Honeywell) all offered families of compatible systems that were internally consistent, but were not compatible with competing vendor systems (for further documentation see Fisher et al., 1983b) . In general, staying with the incumbent vendor, whoever it was, usually minimized switching costs. However, a mix-and-match market for some components had arisen by the late 1970s, particularly within the IBM family.
The Effects of Technical Change on Lock-in
Technological trends greatly influenced the possibilities for vendor and technological lock-in. During this time, many of the large manufacturers were competing to develop new applications for their systems, reducing their system prices in order to attract new buyers and prevent the exit of marginal users (Fisher et al., 1983a) . One significant technical advance of the early 1970s, from the buyer's viewpoint, was the increasing development of timesharing systems. While time-sharing had been available to a limited degree to scientific users in the early 1960s, it had not been widely applied to business systems until the early 1970s (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1992) . The main effect on buyers was to complicate the installation of a new system since time sharing potentially required multiple terminals in geographically remote locations.
A second notable advance was associated with decreasing the costs of memory and processing, which lowered the costs of obtaining large-capacity systems. New users could especially benefit from the well-known and well-documented increases in price/performance for newer systems.
Government auditors noted in several instances that the primary motivation for a new system purchase was to increase CPU capacity (GAO, 1980a) , not to replace other features of the systems.
Another important development was the introduction of mini-computers capable of providing the computing capabilities of a small mainframe. These systems were important because they were smaller, easier to manage and led to partial decentralization of computing tasks, especially those not requiring use of a large database stored on a mainframe. However, this trend was only just beginning in the late 1970s and did not result in significant changes until the mid-1980s. 6 A large lead in price/performance by one firm or system over an incumbent's not only attracted new customers, but could be sufficient to motivate a buyer to incur the costs of switching for the additional benefits. Moving was especially likely when old system applications needed radical redesign; that is, when the amount of software being preserved was small or when the users required less technical hand-holding, as in much scientific use.
The unpredictability of technical advances corresponds with Klemperer's conception of the role of uncertainty in vendor competition subject to switching costs. Government agencies were large purchasers of computer systems in the early 1960s, which resulted in a large, aging, installed base of computer systems by the mid-1970s, as shown in Table I. 7 It is also easy to find stories that fit each possibility in Klemperer's schema. For example, many users were satisfied with their previous incumbents or found that the costs of switching exceeded the benefits. Greenstein (1993a) reports that from a sample of offices who were previous mainframe users, >60% purchased a hardware system from their incumbent vendors. In some years, and with some vendors, it was 80 or 90%. 8 Finally, it also was the case that an agency may have invested in a system that was subsequently orphaned by its system sponsor, which left it with no choice but to eventually use a new vendor.
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' Evidence of this coma from Tibia 1 «nd 2, which ihow that DECs ulcs to the government, primarily of the super-mini system the VAX 11/780, begin to accelerate by 1983, but not really before then.
' The importance of the installed base was exacerbated by government policies that favored purchasing rather than leasing systems (Werling, 1983) . For more on the historical determinants of the aging stock of federal computers, see GSA (1986 GSA ( , 1987 Individual cases provide some appreciation for the variety of experiences. GAO (1980a, appendix II) reports several cases, one in the Department of Energy's office at Richland, WA, another at the EPA's office in Research Ihangle Park, NC and one at the Veteran's Administration, where serious underestimates of conversion expenses tilted procurement results away from the incumbent vendor. The GAO concluded that an accurate reflection of conversion expenses should have resulted in choosing the incumbent again. In addition, Kelman (1990, appendix) describes a case where the FAA continued to use compatible systems for air traffic control to avoid the costs and risks of converting software, which had to be running at all times. Kelman also reports on an IRS sole-source procurement of an incumbent vendor's system as a means to minimize the disruption to processing tax-return checks. As still another contrast, the GAO (1980a) reports of a case in the Navy involving six of seven conversions at different centers where the incumbent system vendor (RCA) had exited the market; here the Navy had no choice but to convert its software to a new operating system. Finally, it is important to recognize that while Klemperer's model and the above examples highlight system transactions, they overlook the gradual phasing-in and -out of software and peripherals by users who anticipated technical and system changes.
The Existence and Absence of Gateways between Systems
Gateways play an important role in moving computing closer to mix-and-match systems. In the 1970s, gateways were needed mostly for reducing the costs of moving from one incompatible system to another. The GAO audits offer a systematic approach to these issues.
A user contemplating altering an existing system had to consider: (i) site preparation, such as raising floors, installing cooling units and electrical and communication connections; (ii) training personnel to use a new system's unique features; (iii) dual operation of systems while one is installed, tested and brought up to an acceptable operational level; (iv) disruption of operations while new hardware is installed; and (v) re-optimizing new systems to deal with unanticipated problems (GAO, 1980a) . Most of these expenses are minimal if one stays with the same supplier when upgrading, but the costs of (ii), (iii), (v) and especially converting software can be substantial if a change between suppliers of incompatible technologies occurs (GAO, 1980a, appendix II) .
The importance of gateways is illustrated by the many examples in the public record of functional loss in software from transporting software 258 without gateways. GAO (1980a) reports a case where an agency converted line-for-line a program that previously took 3 minutes to operate and ended up taking 45 minutes to operate on the new system. It also reports a case where a program that previously took 5 hours took 22 on the new system. The user had to completely rewrite the program, at great time and man-hour expense, to take advantage of new system features (when completely rewritten it took only 3 hours to run). The situations that produced the highest conversion costs were those where users had made large investments in 'relation-specific' assets, using Williamson's (1979) schema. For example, application software typically embodies features needed for a unique agency application (buyer specificity) and those that are technically complementary to the system on which it was developed (vendor specificity), especially if the application software is optimized to a manufacturer's architecture. The degree of vendor-specificity is especially high when large databases are formatted so as to take advantage of a hardware system's architecture (NBS, 1980b) . The degree of buyer specificity may also be high when personnel are trained to use one firm's operating system. The more similar the operating systems, whether developed by the same or a different manufacturer, the more skills that are transferable. The cost of retraining depends on how many of the skills developed on one operating system carry over to another, i.e.-the vendor specificity of the training (GAO, 1977b (GAO, , 1980a . For example, more skills carry over between IBM's VM and MVS operating systems than between IBM's and CDCs.
An agency that wanted to move software or databases between incompatible systems could invest either in preserving old software on new machines or in reinventing its software on the new hardware, both timeconsuming and costly options. In-house conversions usually took too long because the required number of programmers exceeded an agency's available staff, especially with large jobs. Moreover, the old staff usually had little experience with conversion and misunderstood what was required (GAO, 1980a , NBS, 1980a . Programmer knowledge about software implementation, programming procedures and database design were useful on an old system, but not necessarily on a new system (NBS, 1983) . This last switching cost is typically incurred during 'retraining' and does not include nonpecuniary costs such as morale or staff turnover (GAO, 1980a, p. 44) .
The GAO (1980a) also observed that conversion was not easy to contract out of house. Contracting out for such services could be quite difficult and expensive because performance standards were difficult to specify, especially when the software application was idiosyncratic to the agency. Conversion experts also were difficult to find in private industry since this type of problem 259
was not common outside of the government (GAO, 1981) . Many private firms that bid on conversion jobs were undependable and agencies frequently had to use their own staff members to refine the conversion programs for which they contracted (GAO, 1980a, pp. 49, 52, 51, 57, 61) . For example, the GAO reports that the EPA eventually had to abandon all the code written by a firm that had subcontracted the software conversion from an IBM 360/50 to a Univac 1110 because the new code was not optimized for the new system.
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Some gateways and bridges were available to a limited degree in the late 1970s.
11 The increasing number of higher-level languages and their standardization, especially Fortran and COBOL, partially alleviated the dearth of gateways on other levels (NBS, 1977) . In the latter part of the decade, programmers found it possible to move programs between systems, with a certain amount of investment in reprogramming system-specific features, if they were written in higher-level languages. In addition, database design became more general and standardized as the decade progressed, which helped lower the costs of moving databases (NBS, 1980b) . Of course, such changes did not eliminate the problems of upgrading and transporting programs and important databases written in lower-level languages in the 1960s and early 1970s, which constituted most of the aging installed base of system software at the federal government by the mid-1970s.
Were the Costs of Lock-In High Enough to Matter?
Despite much information about computer procurement, the level of switching costs is usually not known because disclosure laws prevent outsiders from examining the costs that influenced decision making in an actual acquisition. However, the federal government audited several system conversions to find out the full magnitude of conversion costs in 14 cases (GAO, 1980a; NBS, 1980a; OSD, 1983b) and parts of these audits were made public (summarized in Greenstein, 1989 ; see appendix 2 for a cost breakdown). This is a unique set of examples. No comparable set of audits exists for private industry buyers.
These studies found that total switching costs between incompatible " Not only did the conversion take yean longer thin scheduled, but many of the 'converted' programs took longer to run on the new system, and tome gave different answers than before! (GAO, 1980a, p. 43).
" Some gateways were hold-orers from the 1960s. Fisher ft ml. (1983a, p. 198) discuss translation between the Honeywell 200 and the IBM 1400 (the predecessor to the 360). Their discussion seems to presume that use of this emulator was fairly costless, though such a (act has less bearing on this time period.
systems could vary over a large range. The estimated and actual costs (in mid-1970s dollars) of software conversion alone were large: $1.5 million for software conversion at the EPA; 531,000 lines of code converted for an estimated $950,000 at the Naval Base in Norfolk; 125,000 lines of applications for an estimated $559,000 at the Naval Base in Jacksonville; 332 application programs for $486,000 was estimated at the Pensacola Naval Base (291 programs were eventually converted for $4.5 million); 14 of 571 programs totally converted and many partially done at a cost of $3.4 million at the USDA in Kansas City; 571 application programs for $3.4 million, 296 programs estimated at $338,000 for the USDA in New Orleans, but which eventually came to several million; and $4.5 million for application software conversion at the VA. All these studies leave the impression that switching costs are distributed asymmetrically, bounded from below and skewed upward by a few particularly costly and unpredictable circumstances.
To standardize these numbers, the estimates of conversion expenses can be compared against the average hardware system price for the system actually acquired (prices axe taken from the IDC General Purpose Surveys, 1981).
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The conversion cost/acquisition price ratio came to 23, 22, 27, 50, 68, 79, 150, 210 and 250% in the eight cases where auditors computed all conversion expenses. Alternatively, it is possible to compare the same conversion estimates against the IDC average monthly rental for that system in the year of installation. These came to 13, 14, 32, 37, 46, 70, 72, 123 and 128 times the monthly rental price for the system acquired. 13 The lowest conversion expenses involved an upgrade between machines from the compatible IBM system 360 and 370 families. This compatible upgrade had total software conversion expenses of $13,900. All the system-specific features of software implemented on the 360 were preserved in the upgrade to the larger 370 machine. These conversion expenses totaled 1% of the acquisition price, or one-half of the cost of one month's average rental. Admittedly, these are ballpark estimates. Net conversion costs may have been slightly overestimated since even same-supplier upgrades contain some switching costs or are underestimated by neglecting some non-pecuniary costs. Moreover, some allowance must be made for the limited technical expertise concerning switching costs in the late 1970s within the federal government. Once switching costs were better understood by the early to mid-1980s, they should have been somewhat lower. Nevertheless, these studies leave the impression that the costs could only be partially attributed to limited technical expertise. Even where there was some expertise, as in the military, costs could still be substantial.
These audits indicate that switching costs could be large enough to influence buyer decision making. At the very least, one would expect users to demand either substantial price discounts from non-incumbents relative to an incumbent's price for a similar system, or substantial performance attributes. One open empirical issue is whether the examples described by government auditors are representative of the wider set of cases where conversions were considered but not attempted.
14 A contemporary observer indicated that lock-in was pervasive when he said (NBS, 1983, p. 177 
):
When there is a significant investment in software and data, the cost, risk and delay of conversion to a new architecture will be undertaken only for software which has no compatible migration path or when other 'requirements' dictate that decision. This conversion policy has resulted in a de facto 'market share' for installed architectures so long as they continue to grow.
Factors within the Control of the Buyer
If buyers of computer systems were aware that their decisions could lead to technological and vendor lock-in, one would expect them to take actions in anticipation of these difficulties. There is considerable documentation consistent with the prediction. These actions had important consequences for buyer tendency to lock-in to technologies. This section of the paper documents some of these and analyzes their economic determinants. This section documents five types of actions: (i) creation of the Office of Software Development; (ii) sponsorship and reliance on Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS); (iii) emphasis on use of higher-level programming languages which makes applications more portable across multiple vendors' hardware and operating system platforms; (iv) attempts to lessen the uncertainty by sharing information on switching costs; and (v) reform of bidding procedures. This is probably only a partial listing of all the strategies that government agencies could follow; however, it is a complete listing of those documented in government reports by GSA, GAO and NBS about conversion expenses.
Developing In-house Gateways for Conversion
Federal agencies did not rely solely on third-party vendors (nor on system vendors) to provide them with gateways between otherwise incompatible systems. Oversight and advisory agencies provided aid in the form of expert advice, bibliographic material on conversion tools and other managerial guidance material. For example, in the early 1980s, the GSA created the Office of Software Development (OSD), which houses experts in conversion problems, professionals who are experienced in the special tools required for conversion. It is interesting to note that the OSD was established partly as a response to the problems associated with the cases analyzed by the GAO.
The federal government is probably unique among mainframe users in that it is sufficiently large to develop an office such as the OSD. Very few other users would have such a large installed base with so many different vendors generating a frequent stream of problems for the in-house staff, or make a sufficient number of conversions per year to merit an in-house expert on the subject (GAO, 1981) . What is not unique is the underlying motivation: reducing the costs of switching between vendors developing reliable means for converting between their systems.
Anticipatory Gateways: Reducing Vendor-specificity Users can make extensive efforts to change expected conversion expenses. These 'anticipatory gateways' anticipate conversion expenses that may or may not be realized, depending on whether a buyer switches between incompatible systems. What is interesting in this case is that most anticipatory gateways attempted to reduce vendor-specificity and bring vendors closer to offering compatible product lines.
Some government-wide programs passed the costs of anticipatory conversions on to vendors. These included attempts to standardize manufacturers' higher-level programming languages. These programs were designed to eliminate vendor-specific features from the application software used on their systems. There are a large number of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publications devoted solely to this subject (NBS, 1977) . One means for forcing manufacturers to follow FIPS standards was to require them in procurement contracts. Generally speaking, it was widely believed that all firms other than IBM were in favor of these FIP requirements. Federal agencies also attempted to coordinate manufacturers to produce similar physical interfaces (for a review see NBS, 1977) . Other efforts were aimed at standardizing software at different agencies for a few well-developed programs and to establish software pools where agencies could swap programs. Aside from eliminating redundancy, the latter two efforts tried to make basic software available to all computer users, no matter who the hardware manufacturer was.
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Government-wide efforts were also aimed at changing agency programming practices, irrespective of the application. These were connected with attempts to standardize all programming in higher-level languages, such as ADA (Langlois and Mowery, 1994) or COBOL, and to provide advisory material on the need for 'documented, modular programming' in these languages (GAO, 1977a (GAO, , 1980a OSD, 1983b) . Once again, these were attempts to eliminate as much vendor specificity from vendor languages as possible so that users could more easily move programs between vendors. Notice that this is a very decentralized initiative. Each agency's programmers incurred the costs of more thorough documentation and more modular programming practices.
These efforts were mostly initiated in the late 1970s in reaction to a perceived problem, i.e. that these costs often were not incurred in the early 1970s. The results of a 1977 survey (GAO, 1977a, appendix II) put to rest any misperception that ideal programming practices had been followed in earlier eras. For example, over three-quarters of the MIS managers and programmers surveyed thought that conversion costs were raised because programs were missing appropriate documentation or were not well structured (GAO, 1977a, p. 36) .
What is not unique in this case is the motivation to adopt programming practices designed to reduce future conversion expenses by eliminating reliance on vendor-specific assets. A program written in higher-level languages is compatible with a large number of operating systems. These programming practices reduced the degree of incompatibility between competing systems in future system competition. What is almost unique about the federal government is that as a large buyer of hardware and software it could feasibly request that all vendors conform to FIP standards.
" It U interesting to note that auditors documented difficulties with these effort! because software embedded agency-specific features. Each software writer within an agency tended to design and modify programs to its own unique needs, not considering whether another agency might want to copy it or desire another modified configuration (GAO, 1977a) . This is partly due to the sophisticated programmer's tendency to use the most convenient features of a system when writing programs, features that need not be the same on other machines. One might expect manufacturers to encourage this programming practice as a means to raise switching costs.
Other examples of such comprehensive buyer-sponsored standards are not rare during this time period, but they are not common either. 16 Finally, what is almost unique about this particular historical setting is the market structure. IBM's dominance of the commercial mainframe market put it in strong bargaining position vis-^-vis the federal government (some might have said that IBM had a monopolistic position). In general, bargaining positions will depend on market structure, which will vary over time for a variety of historical reasons, so the outcomes from these bargains should also vary.
The larger point here is that vendor specificity is partly a choice-variable for the buyer. Buyer decisions regarding vendors are not made solely at the time in which a replacement acquisition is installed. Rather, a foresighted user will anticipate that daily decisions regarding programming practices and equipment maintenance influence the costs of switching during a later vendor decision. An agency can take actions to reduce the degree of reliance on vendor-specific assets, reducing the degree of vendor lock-in. As a secondary consequence, these actions better enable the agencies to mix and match hardware and software from otherwise incompatible families of systems.
Reduction of Uncertainties over Conversion Cost Estimation
Prior to the early 1980s federal agencies had no systematic methods for estimating software conversion expenses between incompatible systems (Cabral and Greenstein, 1990) ; large discrepancies between estimated and actual conversion expenses resulted (GAO, 1980a, p. 10 ). The debate that followed the adoption of systematic procedures exemplified the actions that buyers could take in the face of such uncertainty.
In the 1980s federal procurement procedures required agencies considering replacement acquisitions to estimate the costs of switching vendors before taking bids from incumbent and non-incumbent firms (OSD, 1982 (OSD, , 1983a (OSD, , 1984 ." These estimates are important because they largely determined future decisions. On the one hand, a large underestimate of the switching costs could lead {ex post) to an 'unnecessary' switch to a new vendor. On the other hand, a large overestimate may have limited the number of firms who could feasibly bid on a procurement. If these limits are severe enough, it a Other example! ire the MAP standards originally sponsored by GM (tee Breinahan and Chopra, 1990), airframe designs (for safety reasons), military system purchases (for reliability) and, of course, any firm which vertically integrates to design standard] at various points in a network (e.g. AT&T).
" Strictly speaking, this a not entirely true. An agency may choose to organize bidding procedures so that competing vendors estimate the costs of switching. However, agencies have found that they are more likely to get an accurate estimate with in-house experts.
grants an incumbent vendor monopoly power over the next upgrade, which can lead to a more costly acquisition price (Cabral and Greenstein, 1990) .
In practice, the consequences of biased estimation depend on the supply of plug compatible components and system manufacturers, which varied considerably over the period. For example, the concern about monopoly power applied best to the mid-1970s when there was only limited competition for plug-compatible CPUs for any vendor. By the early 1980s, if an estimate of switching costs limited competition to IBM36O/37O plugcompatible manufacturers, then the agency could still have a competitive procurement (between IBM, Amdahl and NAS) which would lessen concerns about monopoly power. If an agency limited competition to those making systems by another vendor, say Sperry-Univac, Honeywell or CDC, where no plug-compatible competitor exists, then a sole-source acquisition is much more likely [see Greenstein (1995) for an empirical implementation of this model].
The main point of this example is that buyers could and did take actions to reduce the amount of uncertainty regarding the costs of switching to incompatible vendors. After all, OSD invested significant resources in producing an acceptable conversion cost model that could be used for prediction purposes (OSD, 1984 (OSD, , 1986 . This investment, like many others, reduced the costs associated with biased estimates.
What results from better information? If federal buyers tended to exaggerate the costs of switching, either due to a lack of information or risk aversion on the part of the person doing the estimate, then a reduction in uncertainty would tend to reduce the likelihood of incumbent lock-in. As agencies got more experience with making these estimates, one would expect vendor lock-in to diminish, though not to disappear.
Bidding Procedures
The federal government is unique among computer buyers in the degree to which its acquisition process is regulated by procedures that circumscribe agency discretion-much more than an equivalent private industry buyer or a university buyer (GAO, 1981; Kelman, 1991) . Though unusual, this degree of formalization is interesting because it highlights the number of ways a buyer can manipulate acquisition procedures to reduce the costs of choosing among incompatible vendors.
To understand the impact of these procedures on switching costs, it is useful to understand their historical origins. Formal procedures arose within federal procurement because the user and buyer of a system were not necessarily the 266 same decision maker. As was common for mainframe use throughout the country in the 1970s (Inmon, 1986) , mainframes were centrally managed. Typically a small number of experts within an agency's computer systems department made the majority of daily decisions concerning mainframe use. As a result, large capital purchases like mainframe computers tended to be funded by someone other than those who eventually used the system. In the case of the federal government, the US Congress ultimately provided funding for the equipment. This separation of funding and use often led to principal/agent conflicts over the rules governing the procurement process and daily system use (Greenstein, 1993b) . It is commonly believed that agents value technically proficient systems more than and dollar savings less than the principal. In other words, an agent will prefer the computer equivalent of a 'Cadillac', while the principal would rather he used a 'Chevy' (Kelman, 1990; Marshall et al., 1994a,b) . In addition, agencies prefer an incumbent to non-incumbent if staying with the incumbent vendor requires less effort.
Principal/agent problems influenced user investments in anticipatory gateways and information gathering activities. A simple theoretical analysis shows why. Users may not have the correct incentives to invest in anticipatory converters because they do not internalize the full costs of granting the incumbent monopoly power in a future acquisition. "Vet, only users are in a position to make these investments and their behavior is difficult to monitor. For similar reasons, users may also not have the correct incentives to estimate switching costs properly, though they usually have the best information regarding such costs since they are closer to the problem. Of course, an oversight agency would not trust an agency's self-serving estimates, expert or not.
In practice, the public record is replete with examples of principal/ agent-type conflicts between federal computer users and their oversight agencies concerning conversion issues. The references contain a partial listing of this record (see the various US government publications). Principals used a whole array of tools to influence agency conversion policies, including holding Congressional hearings (GAO, 1977a ; see also the summary in Werling, 1983) , requesting frequent audits from the GAO (see GAO, 1977c for summaries) and enforcing administrative procedures (Greenstein, 1993b) . Issues concerned the rules for limiting procurement to compatible vendors, the procedures followed for those estimating switching costs, the valuation placed on intangible components of conversion expenses, the rules for limiting or necessitating hardware and software servicing and upgrades, the rules for finding exception to 'critical mission' defense purchases and the rules for 267 determining out-sourcing of software conversion. Of course, these examples, by their selection, indicate that not all principal/agent problems persisted. On the other hand, it is not clear how extensive these are-though it seems doubtful that the GAO, NBS and GSA spent the time and resources studying unimportant and isolated examples.
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In one respect, federal computer experts were just like their private industry counterparts-agencies delegated decisions to experts in their field and insulated them from other parts of the organization by a hierarchy (Inmon, 1986) . This delegation alone meant that users may not possess appropriate incentives to make anticipatory investments. In another respect, federal agencies were unusual. Economists tend to think that budget considerations affect the incentives of workers in the public sector less than in the private. The absence of any structural incentives to realize future organizational goals might lead to more myopic behavior by federal agencies than one would find in the private sector.
In short, the main point to be made here is that the organization of procurement decision making will influence users' incentives to attempt to reduce vendor lock-in. That is, the tendency for a market to lock-in to a technology depends on the incentives of decision makers to internalize the benefits from reducing reliance of vendor-specific assets; these incentives should differ in private industry and in other parts of the computer market, depending on the degree of discretion granted users in their choices of vendors.
19 Furthermore, one would also expect differences over time as decisions over computer use became more decentralized in most organizations in the 1980s (Inmon, 1986) in response to computer system entry within the minicomputer, microcomputer and workstation markets. Clearly, however, a buyer's choices depend as much on the buyer's preferences as on the choices available. When choices were limited in the past, buyers made do with what they could get. In today's world of overwhelming choice, they obviously can do better. Since these changes to market structure historically co-vary with changes to management practice within computing use, its seems fruitless to assign partial responsibility to changes in 'market structure' and 'buyer centralization'. Nonetheless, this study shows that an important part of any " Indeed, the creation of systematic procurement practice*, the creation of the OSD out oft special unit of the Navy and the creation of »everal manuals for helping agencies undergoing converjionj were regarded u a significant and positive result from these reports. " One similarity is the separation of user and buyer. Due to their technical delicacy, size and complexity, mainframe computers tended to be oveneen by specialized departments within private firms. It was not at all unusual in the 1970s and early 1980s for system users and the source of funding to be separate in large private firms (Inmon, 1986) . explanation for historical change must recognize the role of intra-firm organization.
Summary
The record regarding the behavior of federal computer users does not warrant a simple view of buyer behavior before or after buyers purchase products with potential compatibility problems. The simplest proposition one can make is that buyers seek to reduce lock-in to a vendor when lock-in produces monopoly rents. "Vet, this simple proposition belies the wide variety of actions buyers take and the complexity of the behavior historically exhibited. The record provides a wide variety of examples of buyers who made investments in anticipation of or in response to lock-in and those who collected information, manipulated bidding procedures and changed management practices in anticipation of or in response to incompatibility problems.
Did these actions completely eliminate switching costs? Certainly not. Many of the factors producing these costs were linked to market structure, technical features of the product and other factors outside the control of buyers; these were slow to change. Indeed, many still operate today. Did they reduce switching costs? Certainly, but the record makes clear that progress was slow to come and uneven across hundreds of agency offices; each new case required individual attention even if agencies understood how to apply general lessons from one case to another. The overall degree of change cannot be easily assessed or measured (Greenstein, 1993a) .
As a case study from the government, it is not surprising to find examples of actions that attempted to align the incentives of agency employees with management desires. What is interesting is that many of these problems do not appear to depend on factors unique to the government; one would still expect similar problems in a private setting. Specifically, managers and programmers do not share the same incentives to bias their estimates of conversion expenses too high or too low. Managers do not want to enhance the advantage to an incumbent vendor as much as programmers do. Nor do the two groups share the same incentives to make anticipatory investments. In other words, the management issues are endemic to centrally managed mainframe computing for technical and economic reasons. The federal government's peculiarly bureaucratic norms may have exacerbated these problems and retarded the adoption of effective solutions, but many of their general features seem representative of organizational issues found in the private sector as well.
It is important to note, in retrospect, that not all of these actions by government agencies are unambiguously welfare enhancing. Some actions 269 merely transfer rents from seller to buyer, e.g. those that induced more aggressive bidding from vendors. Some actions, such as those designed to decrease the use of proprietary technology, move the whole industry toward a mix-and-match structure with many firms. This is clearly in society's longterm interest. Other actions have more ambiguous welfare consequences, such as some anticipatory investments. These investments are costly, sometimes leading to gateways between complementary or competing products, but sometimes leading users to plan for events that never occur. Though federal agencies did not entirely eliminate their lock-in problems, they did partially move the market towards a more mix-and-match environment. This movement raises the question of the success of similar undertakings from nationwide private buyers. Other thinking on buyervendor lock-in and the organization of hierarchies (e.g. Williamson, 1979; Scheffman and Spiller, 1991) , and research on the evolution of the computer industry over the 1980s (e.g. Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1992) , suggest that there is an important and rich area for further research. Does switching costs limit buyer willingness to adopt new computing platforms today? Does the increasing decentralization of computing systems today change the ability of buyers to reduce the negative aspects of lock-in? How dramatically has buyer/seller bargaining over lock-in changed as the industry moves to technically complex networked systems comprising components with quasi-open and less proprietary standards? These are topics about which we know few facts; however, interest in these questions has not abated since the key events of this case study took place over two decades ago. This case study provides a reference point for understanding how to analyze these questions.
